DAMAGES
act of 1855, incorporated into Code
of 1873, it is provided that a railway company shall be liable to an
employ6 as to a passenger for want
of care in running their train. The
fact of his being an employ6 shall
not bar his recovery if he is himself
without default.
NoTz.-For an exhaustive dis-
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cussion of the whole subject see
McKinney on " Fellow Servants,"
and for the cases in Pennsylvania,
a pamphlet by Mr. A. Bolles, issued
by Department of the Interior of
Pennsylvania, in 189i, on "The
Liability of Employers in Pennsylvania."
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Eminent Domain:-Leaseholds-Damages.
Where, in a proceeding to recover damages for leasehold premises appropriated by a railroad company under the right of eminent domain, it
appears that plaintiffi were under a contract to remove daily from the gas.
works of the City of Philadelphia, adjoining their leased premises on the.
River Schuylkill, a large quantity of tar, and that the premises in question, which they leased from the city, enabled them to receive the tar
without cost and to manufacture it without transporting it to and from
distant points, it is proper to admit evidence that, after the land was taken,
it became necessary to carry the tar to a place of distillation by a boat
specially constructed; that it was necessary to erect temporary works for
the distillation of the tar when received; and that it was necessary to.
haul over inaccessible roads the barrels needed to hold the tar and its,
.products.
THE MnASURE OF DAMAGES FOR THE APPROPRIATION OF LEAsEHoLDs,
,By THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN.
There aie two requisites to a
valid exercise of the right of eminent domain: the property taken

must be for a public purpose and
compensation must be made. Constitutios of the various States con-

1 Reported in 30 W. N. C., 564; 151 Pa., 158.
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.ain provisions guaranteeing just
compensation for property appropriated by an exercise of the sovereign's delegated right of eminent
domain. But before the enactment
of constitutions the right to compensation was admitted as an indispensable incident to the right, and
in reality is independent of constitutional authority: 3o Am. Law
Reg., 449, 452, 465.
Where an entire tract of land
is appropriated, the compensation
to the owner is its market value in
money: 30.Am. Law Reg., 491; 6
Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 567;
Lewis on Eminent Domain, H 463,
478. Where only a portion of a
tract of land is taken, the value of
what is appropriated is recoverable
and damages to the portion unappropriated : .Lewis on Eminent Domain, g.464. But it often happens
that the partial appropriation benefits the unappropriated part of a
tract of land. In that event the
measure of compensation differs in
various States: Id., 465. In Mississippi benefits are not considered:
Id., 466. In Maryland, Nebraska,
Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia
and Wisconsin special benefits only
are allowed to be set off against
damages to the remainder, but not
against the value of the land which
is taken: Id., 467. In Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana and Texas,
general and special benefits can be
set off against damages to the part
ofland not taken, but not against the
value of what is taken: Id., 468.
In Alabama, California, Delaware,
Illinois, Indiana, New York, Ohio,
Oregon and South Carolina general
and special benefits may be set off
against both damages to the remainder and the value of the part
of the land taken: Id., 470. In
Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, Min-

nesota, Massachusetts, Missouri,
New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania and
Vermont only special benefits may
be set off against both the value of
the part taken and damages to the
portion of the land unappropriated:
Id.,
469. The rule in Pennsylvania was formulated by GIsSON,
J., as follows: "What would the
property, unaffected by the obstruction, have sold for, at the time
the injury was committed? What
would it have sold for, as affected
by the injury? The difference is
the true measure of compensation: "
Schuylkill Navigation Co. v. Thoburn, 7 .S. & R., 411, 422-3 (1821).
In the adjustment of thisdifference,
a fair and just comparison must be
made of the advantages and disadvantages necessarily resulting.
Special advantages and actual disadvantages to the particular property alone are to be considered. If'
the particular property advances in
market value beyond the general
increase in value of other neighboring properties, this element of ad-vantage can be considered. The
disadvantages must, in no sense,
be speculative, but it is essential
that they affect the present market
value of the land: 30 Am. Law
Reg., 492-3. The market value includes the value for particular uses
to which the land is peculiarly
adapted: Lewis on Eminent Do-main, . 479; 3o Am. Law Reg.,
498. But speculative inquiries as
to possible uses and improvements
of the property are not permissible
in estimating damages: Lewis on
Eminent Domain: Id., ? 480. In
estimating damages for the ap-propriation of a portion of a farm,
the jury may consider, as an element of damage in estimating the
injury to the entire tract, that a part
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was ripe for building improvement;
but calculations based upon values
.at which the building lots would
sell are erroneous: Wilson v. Equitable Gas Co., 31 W. N. C., 451
(1893). The compensationmust be
,estimated for the land as such: Lewis
on Eminent Domain,
486. The
value of land as farming land or
mining land is recoverable; but the
value of coal or stone, supposed to
underlie the tract, is not to be conSsidered: Id., 30 Am. Law Reg.,
497. The elements to be considered
are "as varied as the properties affected and the uses to which they
-are applied:" Kersey v. R. R. Co.,
133 Pa., 234, 240; 25 W. N. C., 455
.(I89o). In Pittsburg, Brad. & Buf.
Rwy. Co. v. McCloskey, iio Pa.,
436, 442," 443 (I885), CLARK, J.,
said: "The inconvenience arising
from a division of property or from
increased difficulty of access, the
burden of increased fencing, the
ordinary danger from accidental
fires to the fetces, fields or farm
buildings, not resulting from negligence, and generally all such matters as, owing to the particular
location of the road, may affect the
-convenient use and future enjoyment of the property, are proper
matters for consideration; but they
are to be considered in comparison
with the advantages only as .they
affect the market value of the
land." The risk of fire and the
cost of fencing are elements to be
considered in estimating damages:
Lewis on Eminent Domain, H 497,
498; 30 Am. Law Reg., 496. Evi.dence of the loss of custom of a
mill, in consequence of a location
of a railroad in front of it, is admissible, not as a distinct or legitimate item of damage, but to show
to what extent the value of the mill
property has been lessened: 30 Am.

Law Reg., 496. But any supposed
loss of profits cannot be considered,
though the fact that the premises
are more difficult to rent is an element which may be considered in
determining the difference in value:
Id.; Lewis on Eminent Domain,
487. In Pittsburg and Western
R.. R. Co. v. Patterson, 107 Pa.,
461, 464-5 (1885), CLARK, J., said:
"The use to which the property
has been, or may be, applied, is
proper for the consideration of the
jury, in the estimate of its value;
its adaptation -for any particular
purpose may enhance its market
value; but the Court was certainly
correct in saying that the jury
could not take into consideration
any supposed loss to the plaintiff of
profits in his business. Such an
assessment would be purely speculative, and a rule which justified it
would lead to most ruinous results.
If the property, by reason of its
location or otherwise, is especially
adapted to any particular use to
which it is applied, if it is worth
more for that particular use than
for any other, its market value will
be measured accordingly."
Mr.
LPWIs says, in his treatise on Eminent Domain,
487 (1888): "The
profits of a business do not tend to
prove the value of the property
upon which it is conducted. The
profits of a business depend upon
its extent and character, and the
manner in which it is conducted.
One man will get rich while another will become bankrupt in conducting the same business upon the
same property. It is proper, however, to show how the taking will
interfere with the use of the property, eitherforthe purpose to which
it is actually devoted, or for any
purpose to which it is adapted."
The foregoing general principles
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are peculiarly applicable to the appropriation of property in possession of the owner; but the owner
may have leased his estate to a
tenant whose possession is disturbed by an appropriation of the
property by the exercise of the
right of eminent domain. Such a
case was that of Ehret v. Schuylkill
River East Side R. R. Co., 151 Pa.,
158 (1892), of which this article is
an annotation.
A tenant for years being the
owner of an estate in the land, it is
well established that he may recover
damages to his interest: 3o Am.
Law Reg., 500, 5oi; 6 Am. and
Eng. Ency. of Law, 59o; Lewis on
Eminent Domain, 483; .Ehret v.
Schuylkill River East Side R. R.
Co., 151 Pa., 158 (1892); Kersey v.
Schuylkill River East Side R. R.
Co., 133 Id., 234 (189o); Penna. S..
V. R. R. Co. vz. Ziemer, 124 Id.,
560, 571 (1889); Lafferty v. Schuylkill River East Side R. R. Co., Id.,
297 (1889); Phila & Read. R. R.
Co. v. Getz. 113 Id., 214 (1886);
Pittsburg & Lake Erie R. R. Co.
v. Jones, xxi Id., 204(1886); Penna.
R. R. Co. v. Eby, io7 Id., x66
(I884); Getz v. Phila. & Read.
R. R. Co., Io5 Pa., 547 (1884). In
Brown v. Powell, 25 Pa., 229, 231
(1855), LBwIs, C. J., said: "A
tenant for years is an owner within
the meaning of the Act, and is entitled to compensation, according
to his interest." See, also, Turnpike Road v. Brosi, 22 Pa., 29
(1853); Frost v,. Earnest, 4 Wharton
tPa.), 86 (1838); Fitzpatrick v.
Penna. R. R. Co., io Phila. (Pa.),
107 (1874); In re Barbadoes St., 8,
Id., 498 (1871); Bait. & Ohio'R. R.
Co. v. Thompson, IO Md., 76
(1856); Burbridge v. R. R. Co., 9
Ind., 546 (1857); Muller v. Earle,
35 N. Y. Supr. Ct. (3 Jones &
24

Spencer), 461 (1873); Livi igston v.
Sulzer, 19 Hun. (N. Y-),375 (1879);
Coutant v. Catlin, 2 Sandford Chan.
(N. Y.), 485 (1845); Turner v.
Williams, io Wendell (N. Y.), 139
(1833); In re Mayor of New York,
34 Hun, 441; 99 N. Y., 569 (1885);
Alex. & Fred. Rwy Co. v. Faunce,
31
Grattan (Va.), 761 (1879);
Brooks v. City of Boston, i9 Pick:,
174 (1837); Patterson v. City of
Boston, 20 Id., 159 (1838); Chicago
& Evanston R. R. Co. v. Dresel,
no Ills., 89 (1884); Booker v. Rwy
Co., 1o Id., 333 (1882).
In No. Penna. R. R. Co. v.
Davis & Leeds, 26 Pa., 238 (1856),
the railroad company purchased
the reversion of land held by
Davis & Leeds as lessees under a
lease for two years with a covenant
for renewal by lessors upon the expiration of the two years if requested, and were using the land as
a lumber yard, with almost a year
of the first term yet to expire, when
the company appropriated it for.
railroad purposes. WOODWARD, J.,
held (p. 241): "The direct injury
done to them, or, in other words,
the value of the thing taken from
them, was to be measured by the
worth of the lot at the stipulated
rents for the residue of the term of
two years and for the whole of the
term of three years. No assessment
of damages or compensation would
have been just and adequate that
did not embrace both these terms,
for the true measure of the interest
the lessees had in the land was the
joint or aggregate value of the two
terms." The company took all
the lessees had in the land, andwere
required to pay for the value of
their entire estate.
In Renwick v. R. R. Co., 49
Iowa, 664, 674 (1878), it was held
that the measure of damages to
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lessees for the location of a railroad
through the leased premises is the
difference between the value of the
annual use of the premises before
taking the right of way and what it
was worth afterward.
In Patterson v. City of Boston, 20
Pick., I59 (1838), it was held that
for the deprivation of the use of a
store the lessee can recover from
the municipality damages computed for such time as would be
reasonably necessary to remove his
goods and make the repairs and
move back again; the loss or value
of the store to him for that period,
and not the rent and taxes spedfically, is the measure of his indemnity. He is also to be remunerated for the diminished value of
the premises caused by the taking
of a portion, for the residue of the
term, he continuing to pay at the
same rate the rent and taxes. But he
cannot recover for loss of custom
because of occupying a less advantageous place of business while
repairs were being made.
In Getz v. Phila. & Read. R. R.
Co., 1o5 Pa., 547 (1884), it was decided that landlord and tenant may
unite in a proceeding to recover
damages for the taking and injury
of the property by a railroad company.- The tenant need not show
that he holds under a written lease
for a term certain; it is sufficient if
it appear that he is a tenant from
year to year at a certain annual
rent. The proper procedure would
be for the jury to designate the
portion of the award to which each
party was entitled. In estimating
the damages to the tenant, the jury
should consider, as elements of
damage, the fact that the location
of the railroad compelled the removal of the business conducted
by the tenant, and the depreciation

in value of the leasehold and of
the machinery and personal property of the tenant which he used in
his business, consequent upon the
removal. The difference between
the value of the machinery in connection with the business conducted on the property and its
value to be removed and applied
to the same or other use, is a
proper element of damage for the
consideration of the jury. In that
case, Hiram S. Getz owned the
premises, and Hiram S. Getz and*
James K. Getz, -trading as H. S.
Getz & Co., were the lessees. The
case came again before the Supreme
Court in x886 (Phila. & Read. R. R.
Co. v. Getz, 113 Pa. 214), and, it
was there explicitly held that' if the
location of a railroad so affects the
property as to compel the removal
of the business conducted by tenants from year to year to another
place, and the machinery used in
the business is in consequence depreciated as it stands, the difference between the value of the
machinery in connection with the
business conducted on the property
and its value to be removed and
applied to the same or other uses,
is an element of damage proper for
the jury's consideration. In ascertaining the value of the machinery
as it stood after the injury, evidence as to the expense of removing it, rendered necessary by the
location of the railroad, from the
property to a newplace of business,
is admissible.,
In Kersey v. Schuylkill River
East Side R. R. Co., 133 Pa., 234
(i89o), the plaintiff-was the lessee
of a wharf property under a lease
having eighteen months to run,
when the defendant's railroad appropriated part of the premises.
The terms of the lease restricted
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him to the use of the property as a
-coal yard. The construction of the
railroad destroyed appliances belonging to him, which were essential to the conduct of his business,
and necessitated the construction
-of others in their place by him,
and an increase in the handling of
coal and breakage and waste of it.
It was held that evidence was admissible to show the amount of the
lessee's necessary expenditure in
reconstructing appliances to secure
the facilities for continuing the
business he had previously enjoyed,
.and the increased expense and loss
in handling the coal with them,
not as specific iteihs of claim, but
as affecting the market value of the
leasehold.
This case wqs followed in Ehret
v. Schuylkill River ]East Side R. R.
Co., 151 Pa., 158 (1892). There*
Ehret & Co. showed that by reason
,of the location of their leasehold
property, which the railroad company appropriated, they were saved
.a certain expense in the performance of a contract, which was made
because of the advantages of the
location, as fixing their damages;
and also showed the cost to fulfil
the contract in another and distant
place, which they were obliged to
obtain because of the loss of the
leasehold. It was urged that such
testimony was a "covert attempt
to recover profits." But the Court
"'held it was nothing of the
kind." These matters "wete elementswhich evidently and properly
entered into the consideration and
'determination of the value of the
lease. It was a part of the property
taken by the defendant company as
locumr terensofthe Commonwealth,
property for which defendant was
bound to make just compensation
to plaintiffs, from whom it was
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taken ....
On principle, as well as
authority, we think such evidence
was not improper. In Railway Co.
v. Vance, 115 Pa., 327, testimony
was received to prove loss of custom at a mill, not with the view of
recovering the amount as damages,
but for the purpose of showing the
extent to which the value of the
mill property has been diminished.
Railroad Co. v. Getz, 113 Pa., 2r4,
recognizes the right of owners of a
leasehold to recover, as damages,
the cost of removing their machinery:" per SiRu.PEtT, J., 15r Pa.,
66, 167.
In Penna. R. R. Co. v. Eby, 107
Pa., 166 (1884), it was held proper
for the plaintiff to prove, as the
measure of damages, the value of
the leasehold over the rent he paid
for it. He was afterward permitted
to testify that had he "stayed on
there, rather than moved away, it
would have paid me $iooo a year; "
which was held to be testimony in
the nature of future profits, and inadmissible. TRuN-Kny, J., said
(p. 173): "It was competent to
prove the market value of the leasehold by the opinion of witnesses in
the same manner as it would be
the value of other property. That
value is what the leasehold was
worth-it was worth to the plaintiff the same sum as it was worth
for sale and transfer, and the mode
of ascertaining the sum is by testimony of witnesses upon its market
value. If by reason of the taking
of the property, or its destruction,
the plaintiff was specially injured,
he is entitled to compensation for
such injury, as for the time necessarily required in removing and
the expenses of such removal, and
for other loss directly resulting from
defendant's act. That does not include estimated profits of future
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34o (1885); Chicago, E. & L. S. R.
trade or business, or other supposed
R. Co. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicaconsequential injury."
In Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R. R. go, i19 Id., 525 (1887.
Co. v. Jones, iiI Pa., 2o4 (1886), the
An interesting subject is the conplaintiff owned a ferry and held a
sideration of the method of assessleasehold in the landing, and the
ing damages as between lessbr and
defendant constructed a railroad
materially interfering with the land- lessee, respectively, when their in-ing of boats. It was held that the terests are entirely taken.
Some of the cases are to the effect
measure of defendant's liability was
that a taking by eminent domain
the difference between the value of
extinguishes the lease, while others.
the leasehold for the purpose to
hold that the covenants are not
which it was applied until the end
necessarily affected: Lewis on Emiof the term under ordinary circum-483; 2 Taylor's.
nent Domain,
stances, and its value for the same
period as affected by the construcLandlord and Tenant, 5i9, and
cases cited in notes; Barclay v.
tion of the railroad, and that it was
Pickles, 38 Mo., 143 (I866). In
error to allow the recovery of damages for the depreciation of the Footev. City of Cincinnati, ii Ohio,
4o8 (1842), it was held that the covevalue of the franchise unconnected
nant to pay rent subsists, though
with the leasehold.
the whole property has been approIn Lafferty v. Schuylkill River
East Side R. R. Co., 124 Pa., 297 priated; and, therefore, the compensation to the lessee by the taker
(1889), a tenant to whom land was
must at least cover such rent. In
demised with notice that a railroad
City of Chicago v. Garrity, 7 Ills.
was located upon it, was allowed
App. (Bradwell), 474 (I88o), it was.
the value of growing crops, deheld that as a tenant is entitled to
stroyed by the construction, whicli
compensation for so much of his.
were planted before he had notice
leasehold estate as is taken for pubof the time when the company
lic use, there is no reason why he
would interferewith his possession.
should be excused from a perform-The right to be paid for an injury
to growing crops passed with the ance of the covenants of the lease;
the condemnation of land does not
right to plant them. Having notice
in any way extinguish the lease.
of the tenant's possession, the company could not discharge their lia- In Parks v.City of Boston, 15 Pick.
(Mass.), 198 (1834); it was held by
bility to him by a payment to his
SHAW, C. J., that lessor and lessee
landlord. The general rule is that
are entitled to recover compensathe value of interests in land is to
tion for the damages sustained by
be determined at the time of the
them respectively in consequence
location of the railroad or comof an appropriation of part of the
mencement of proceedings for conpremises. The lessee must pay the
demnation : Burt v. Merchants' Ins.
rent because he still holds whatwas.
Co., 115 Mass., 1 (1874); Lawrence's
granted him in consideration of the
Appeal, 78 Pa., 365 (1875). Therefore no recovery can be had for im- rent subject to the sovereign right
of 'eminent domain. He has ample
provements made by the lessee after
remedy against the public, the fact.
the filing of a petition to condemn:
that he is compelled to pay full
Schreiber v. R. R. Co., 115 Ills.,

APPROPRIATION OF LEASFHOLDS.
-compensation for al estate diminished fn value being an element of
compensation to be received from
the public. See, also, Patterson v.
City of Boston, 20 Pick, 159 (1838);
O'Brien v. Ball, 119 Mass., 28 (a875);
Folts v. Huntley, 7%Vendell (N. Y.),
210 (1831); Workman v. Mifflin, 30
Pa., 362 (1858); Dyerv. Wightman,
66 Id., 425 (1871).
If a property taken by right of
eminent domain has been leased,
the estate of the landlord is in the
reversion. His voluntary act has
given a part of his estate to his tenant. There is a division of the
.ownership. The landlord is not
entitled to the full value of the
estate, because he has a less interest.
Both lessor and lessee are, therefore, to be compensated in proportion to the damages sustained respectively, because of an appropriation of the property or injury to it
by a taking for public use. The
sum of the damages to those holding
various interests in the property,
therefore, cannot exceed the value
ofthe fee, because the value ofthefee
comprises the values of the various
-estates into which a property is apportioned. If the value of the fee
is paid the owner, the lessee can re,cover from him the value of his
estate, which is included in the fee.
If the entire property be taken,
the measure of damages, as has
been seen, is the market value.
The market value to the lessor is
diminished by the value of the
leasehold. If the leasehold have
no value exceeding the rent, then
the tenant's interest is worth only
the rent for which he is liable. If
under no liability, and possessing a valueless leasehold, the tenant suffers nothing, and the landlord gets the full market value of
the property lie had leased. But

the annual value of a leasehold
often exceeds the annual rent. This
excess of rental value over the rent
reserved is the value of the tenant's
interest, for which he must be compensated.
In re William and Anthony
Streets, x9 Wendell (N. Y.), 678
(1839), it was held that commissioners for laying out streets in New
York, in estimating damages for
property taken, must consider all
covenants and conditions in a lease
where the land is held for a term of
years thereunder. If there is a covenant for renewal, which at the rent
reserved may add to the value of
the tenant's interest, such value, in
addition to the present value of the
term, should be allowed the tenant.
If the rent reserved equals the full
annual value of the property, the
landlord gets all the damages, since
the tenant in that event loses nothing, or, at most, a nominal sum. If
the rent is less than the annual
value, then the tenant sustains a
loss by the appropriation. In that
event the longer the term was to
continue the greater is the tenant's
loss, while the loss to the landlord
as owner of the fee is correspondingly diminished.
So, also, the
covenants in a lease may increase
the value of the reversion and be
detrimental to the tenant, and are
to be considered in estimating the
value of the reversion to the landlord.
It re Morgan R. R. & S. S. Co.,
32 La. An., 371 (188o), it appeared
that the company appropriated a
certain lot of ground in New Orleans for its uses. The lot was
under lease for a term of three
years, with privilege of renewal for
three additional years, at a monthly
rental of$6o. The owner's measure
of damages was held to be the value
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of his property encumbered by a
lease. If the lessee's estate was
only worth what he agreed to pay
for it, then as the company became
the owner subject to the lease, to it
was due the rent in fituro, and
nothing was due by it to the lessee.
But if the lessee's right was worth
more than be agreed to pay for it,
then the company owed him the
amount of this excess, because he
is entitled to the value of the right
taken from him. The compensation to the owner does not include
the lessee's damages because of the
value of the lease beyond the rent
agreed to be paid when the company practically assumes all the
right and estate of the lessor.
SPFN--cR, J., said: "The only true
'test of this excess of the value of
the lease over the stipulated -rental
or price thereof is to ascertain what
sum the right of lease or leasehold
will bring over and above the rent
stipulated to be paid. In the case
before us the rental is $6o per
month. if the right of lease would
sell for $75 per month of its term,
then the excess of its value over
the price is $15 per month."
In Burt v. Merchants' Ins. Co.,
115 Mass., 1 (1874), which was a
proceeding to assess damagesto the
insurance company as owner of
land appropriated for the enlargement of the Boston post office, the
trial judge instructed the jury as
follows: "It is the fair market value
thatyou are to ascertain; and your
verdict will consist of several items,
substantially these: In the first place
you will ascertain the total amount
of the value to the owners of the
estate, estimating the same as an
entire estate, and as if the same
was the sole property of one owner
in fee simple; and that may not improperly be called the total value

of the estate. In the next place
yqu will ascertain the fair value of
the estate to the Merchants' Insurance Company who, in this case,
are the owners of the fee of the
land, In the third item you will
ascertain and find the fair market
value of the interest and term of
Haley, the first lessee. In the fourth
item you will ascertain the fair market value of the interest and term
of Harris & Avery, the sub-lessees.
And the sum of the last three items
will be equal to the first; for it is a
diversion that you are to make
among these several parties in interest." In affirming these instructions GRAY, C. J., said: "No contracts between the ownArs of different interests in the land can affect
the right of the government to take
the land for the public use, or oblige
it to pay by way of compensation
more than the entire value of the
land as a whole. . . . The petitioner shows no just ground of exception to the instructions in this
respect. The jury were clearly directed to ascertain in the first place
the total amount of the value to the
owners of the estate, estimating it
as an entire estate as if it was the
sole property of one owner in fee
simple, regard being had to the situation of the estate and the manner
of its occupation; and then divide
that total value aniong the owners
of the fee and the lessees and sublessees:" 115 Mass., 5, 15-16.
The same conclusion was reached
by the same Court in a previous
case, where itwas said by WELLs, J.:
"The situation of the estate and
the manner of its occupation are
doubtless to be taken into consideration in estimating the injury
calased by disturbing that occupation. But between the public and
the land owner it is but one estate.
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The public right is exercised upon
the land itself, without regard to
subdivisions of interest by which
the subject is affected through the
various contracts of individual owners. The public cannot be expected
to forego its right to take property
for public uses because the exercise
of that right will defeat private contracts; nor is it reasonable that
losses arising from the failure of
such contracts, which otherwise
might furnish grounds of damage
between the individual parties,
should measure the compensation
to be rendered for the property so
taken. Such a rule would seriously
impair the public right. A fair
compensation for the property
taken and injury done, ascertained
by general rules, is a substitute to
the owners for that of which they
are deprived. That is the whole of
the transaction witl which the public is concerned. The apportionment is merely a setting out to the
several owners of partial interests
of their corresponding rights in the
fund which has been substituted
for the property taken :" Edmands
v. City of Boston, io8 Mass., 535,
544 (1871).
In Wiggin v. Mayor of New
York, 9 Paige's Chan., i6, 19 (1841),
WA.woRRTH, Chancellor, said: "If
the tenant has a beneficial lease,
that is, if he has rented the property
for a term of years at less than the
use of the property was actually
worth, he sustains damage by being
deprived of the occupancy at this
low rent during the remainder of
his term. But that damage must
necessarily go to diminish the
amount which the landlord would
have been entitled to receive if the
property had not been under a
lease, or had the rent reserved upon
the lease been the full value of the

use of the lot. The proper way of
assessing the daniages where two
or more persons have distinct interests or estates in property taken
for the improvement is to ascertain
the damage to the whole fee of the
lot in the same manner as if one
person alone had the entire interest
therein; and then to apportion the
amount among the. persons interested in the lot, as landlord and
tenant, or otherwise, according as
the interest of the one or the other
will be affected by the taking of
the property for the improvement."
A similar decision was given Zn
re Application by the City of Buffalo, i Sheldon (N. Y. Super. Ct.),
408, 411 (1874), where SMITH, J.,
said: "This fair market value
which is the just criterion, is not
to be enhanced or in any manner
affected by different or conflicting
rights of parties, having different
estates or interests in the same
land. The sovereign must pay for
the property taken but once, and
but one price for the whole, embracing the estates, rights and interests of all who have any claim.
It is taken as an entirety, and in
the first instance, and so far as the
sovereign is concerned, the compensation is to be fixed without
regard to the separate rights of
those owning or interested in the
land, as between themselves ...
The commissioners are to fix a
value upon each separate estate
and interest in the land, but this is
only for the purpose of awarding
to each his just proportion of the
whole compensation to be paid."
In Coutant v. Catlin, 2 Sandford
Ch., 485, 488 (1845), it was said
that the proper mode of assessing
damages where two or more persons have distinct interests or
estates in lands appropriated by

